Side Trails from Empirical Knowing

A couple of references from "Imperial Secrets" I found interesting:

• Persistent Surveillance and Its Implications for the Common Operating Picture" - Kelley's critique in "Imperial Secrets" was of such statements as "Once achieved, persistent ISR coverage will, in theory, deny the adversary sanctuary, enabling coherent decision making and action with reduced risk." I'm reminded of Dave Snowden's highlighting the fact that we filter ~95% of the raw data that hits our senses, and that the sense we make of what gets through our filters is shaped by a variety of factors, including which narrative fragments have been recently activated. For a nice summary of the limits/biases of individual sensemaking, see "The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis." A Panopticon-style capability would dramatically improve decision making in some ways...but it would also shift attention to the limits imposed by basic cognitive and social constraints on translating data into action, and, perhaps more important, would have significant and unpredictable effects on the activities of those under surveillance. Overall, it would seem that the net result is a more Complex space where prediction becomes more, not less, difficult.


• Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis - Another NDIC publication that thoughtfully considers the art and science of transforming data into decisions. I especially liked Table 7 (Analysis: Past, Present, and Future), which highlights various aspects of the shift from in-depth slice/dice analysis to agile sensemaking.

The challenge of knowing irregular, ambiguous, and rapidly changing threats has resulted in an emphasis on capabilities that are more exploratory/agile than exploitative/structured. A couple of articles in Joint Forces Quarterly (Q1 2009) highlight two aspects to this trend. Both reflect a maturing understanding of the limits of exploratory and exploitative capabilities.

• "Hybrid Warfare and Challenges" (Frank Hoffman, pp. 34-39) - "hybrid warfare"is the term associated with what seems to be the next phase of an ongoing transformation to make the U.S. military more agile. It emphasizes the need to operate in multiple "modes" simultaneously to effectively engage an opponent using conventional, irregular, and terrorist tactics in a coordinated fashion. Hoffman acknowledges the difficulty of such an endeavor...one that is similar in some ways to that discussed by Cash, Earl, and Morrison in the Nov 2008 HBR, which I discussed here.
• "Systems versus Classical Approach to Warfare" (Milan Vego, pp. 40-48) is a good summary of the concerns that have been raised about NCW, EBO, and SOD. Attempts to apply Complicated (expert, analytical) tools to a Complicated domain have, unsurprisingly, provoked reactions ranging from skepticism to hostility among many students of warfare. If you're unfamiliar with recent critiques of Systems of Systems Analysis, Systems Thinking, and other mechanistic approaches to warfare, you might find this article interesting. The bottom line is "Uncertainty in war is not only a result of a lack of information, but is also often caused by what one does not comprehend in a given situation." Analytical approaches (crafted for Complicated situations) may actually degrade the ability to comprehend in Complex situations.

Finally, John Arquilla has been writing about network/swarming tactics for years. "The Coming Swarm" is a recent summary of the current situation...it reminded me of Israel's approach to dealing with swarm terrorism.